Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Another
"Consent terms incorporated in a court's order bind as the court's order, so their wilful breach is civil contempt under Section 2(b) even without an express undertaking, and the availability of execution affects only the court's discretion, not the maintainability of contempt proceedings."
Issues Before the Court
- (i)
Whether wilful breach of consent terms incorporated in an order of the Supreme Court amounts to civil contempt, although the terms contained no express undertaking to the Court?
- (ii)
Whether the fact that a consent decree can be executed under the Code of Civil Procedure bars contempt proceedings for its breach?
Law & Rules Applicable
- (i)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 2(b) (civil contempt: wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order or other process of a court, or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court).
- (ii)
Constitution of India, Article 129 (power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself).
Application to Facts & Circumstances
Rama Narang and two of his sons had litigated for years over the control of a company. In December 2001 the Supreme Court recorded minutes of a consent order signed by the parties, providing for joint management, decisions by written consent and joint operation of the bank accounts, and in January 2002 it disposed of the suits it had withdrawn to itself in terms of that order. Alleging breach of those terms, the father filed a contempt petition. The sons objected that a consent order containing no undertaking to the Court could not found contempt.
Writing for the Court, Ruma Pal J. held that Section 2(b) has two limbs: wilful disobedience of a court's order, and wilful breach of an undertaking given to the court. Under the first limb the statute draws no distinction between an order passed after adjudication and one passed by consent. A consent decree is a contract with the imprimatur of the court, and violating its terms is a violation of the court's order.
That a consent decree is executable does not oust the contempt jurisdiction; it bears only on the court's discretion, since the weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance. Earlier decisions suggesting otherwise were confined to their facts, and any uncertainty in the earlier law was relevant only to mitigation.
Conclusion & Ruling
- (i)
The preliminary objection to the maintainability of the contempt petition was rejected, and the petition was listed for decision on the merits.
- (ii)
Wilful breach of consent terms incorporated in a court's order is civil contempt under the first limb of Section 2(b), even without an express undertaking to the court.
- (iii)
The availability of execution does not bar contempt proceedings, though the court will use its contempt power with restraint.