Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others
"Article 136 is a constitutional power that no statutory finality clause can exclude, so special leave lies against an Election Tribunal's decision; and a constitutional disqualification not apparent at scrutiny voids only the disqualified candidate's own election, not the whole election."
Issues Before the Court
- (i)
Whether the Supreme Court can grant special leave under Article 136 against the decision of an Election Tribunal, notwithstanding Article 329(b) of the Constitution and Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which made the Tribunal's decision final and conclusive?
- (ii)
Whether the election of a returned candidate who was below the constitutional minimum age falls under Section 100(1)(c) of the Act (improper acceptance of a nomination, which voids the whole election) or under Section 100(2)(c) (non-compliance with the Constitution, which voids only that candidate's election)?
Law & Rules Applicable
- (i)
Constitution of India, Article 136 (special leave to appeal from any court or tribunal) and Article 329(b) (an election may be called in question only by an election petition).
- (ii)
Constitution of India, Article 173 (qualifications for membership of a State Legislature, including a minimum age of twenty-five years for the Legislative Assembly).
- (iii)
Representation of the People Act, 1951, Sections 36, 100 and 105 as they then stood (scrutiny of nominations, grounds for declaring an election void, and finality of the Tribunal's order).
Application to Facts & Circumstances
In a double-member Assembly constituency in Madhya Pradesh, with one general seat and one seat reserved for Scheduled Tribes, the appellant was returned for the general seat and another candidate for the reserved seat. A defeated candidate's election petition alleged that the candidate returned for the reserved seat was under twenty-five. The Election Tribunal found that he was under age and declared the whole election void, treating his nomination as improperly accepted.
On jurisdiction, the Court held that Article 136 is worded in the widest terms and vests a plenary power to grant special leave against any judgment or order of any court or tribunal. Being a constitutional power, it cannot be limited by ordinary legislation: the finality given by Section 105 operates within the Act, but it does not cut down the Supreme Court's powers under Article 136. Article 329(b), which channels challenges to elections into election petitions, did not exclude those powers either.
On the merits, the nomination paper and the electoral roll showed the candidate as qualified, and no objection was raised at scrutiny. In those circumstances the Returning Officer had no option but to accept the nomination, so its acceptance was not improper. The defect emerged only from evidence before the Tribunal.
What had happened was that a person not qualified under the Constitution had been returned, which is non-compliance with the Constitution under Section 100(2)(c). That ground affects the election of the disqualified candidate alone, not the election as a whole.
Conclusion & Ruling
- (i)
The appeal was allowed in part: the election of the under-age candidate was declared void, and the appellant's election to the general seat was upheld.
- (ii)
Article 136 extends to the decisions of Election Tribunals and other tribunals; a statutory clause declaring a tribunal's decision final does not exclude the Supreme Court's special leave jurisdiction.
- (iii)
Where a candidate's disqualification is not apparent at scrutiny and no objection is raised, acceptance of the nomination is not improper, and only the disqualified candidate's election is set aside.